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Abstract 
The U.S. Navy has been studying a policy of indefinite reenlistment for Senior 
Petty Officers (Grades E-6 to E-9) for about ten years.  This policy requires all 
sailors with a rank of E-6 to E-9 to reenlist indefinitely, rather than execute 
reenlistment contracts (the current policy).  Their new separation date becomes 
either the year they are required to separate (their high year of tenure if not 
promoted) or their retirement date (usually a voluntary choice).  Of course, a sailor 
can request to leave service at any time, which mirrors the officer system.   
This study uses three criteria to analyze the new policy: management 
flexibility, fairness to members and cost. It finds that personnel management in the 
Navy would be improved because sea billet manning could be increased in critical 
ratings; that the policy would be equitable after several years (although some current 
members could be impacted negatively); and, that costs for incentive pay could 
increase by $1.4 M annually.  A survey of officers at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(December, 2008) supports the view that indefinite reenlistment would benefit the 
Navy. 
This study also presents an implementation plan for conversion to indefinite 
reenlistment.  A phase-in approach is taken where critical skills (defined as ratings 
where sea billet manning < 90%) are given the option of conversion at the present 
time.  Those that choose to remain under the current system (reenlistment contracts) 
could do so until retirement, but if promoted they would be converted to the new 
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I. Introduction 
The US Navy is considering converting a portion of its enlisted force (E-6 and 
above) from fixed reenlistment contracts to a system of indefinite reenlistment. Since 
Congress first approved indefinite reenlistments for enlisted personnel in 1998, at 
least two studies have found that the Navy would not derive great benefit from such 
a conversion.  A SAG Corporation study (1998) found that, although indefinite 
reenlistment would reduce the administrative workload involved in the reenlistment 
process, it would not result in any actual billet reductions. The study concluded that 
indefinite reenlistment (IR) has limited benefits and substantial implementation costs. 
Because of the potential long-run effects, the researchers suggested a wait-and-see 
approach before implementing IR.  A 2007 Rand Corporation study, primarily an 
evaluation of the Army NCO system, also conducted focus group interviews with 
Navy senior enlisted personnel (Miller et al., 2007, February). Though improvement 
of NCO morale and increased prestige were two of the reasons for the Army 
conversion, this investigation concluded that the prestige of petty officers would not 
be enhanced by indefinite reenlistment. In addition, the senior enlisted personnel 
described the reenlistment process as an additional screen for quality, something 
that would be lost with indefinite reenlistment. 
The present study analyzes three criteria to assess IR. First, management 
flexibility is a very important goal for the Navy. In order to meet the demands of the 
fleet, leadership must ensure that promotion, sea-shore rotation and assignment 
policies are coordinated with reenlistment procedures to maximize sea manning. 
These management considerations are examined in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 discusses 
the cost implications of converting to IR. Leadership must consider balancing the 
needs of the Navy with fairness to its members; the equity for current members is 
considered in Chapter 4. 
The opinions of naval officers at the Naval Postgraduate School are 
presented in Chapter 5; in general, their experiences with the Chief Petty Officer 
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force provide support for conversion to IR.  Chapter 6 concludes with a plan for 
conversion from fixed reenlistments to indefinite reenlistments for grades E-6 and 
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II. Management Flexibility 
The Navy is currently investigating several management changes to improve 
its levels of readiness and sea manning.  The initiatives are rotational crewing and 
the creation of extra manning pools.  The primary advantage of rotational crewing is 
the ability to maximize the fleet’s forward presence while complying with Navy 
personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) rules. Additional manning pools are designed to 
provide quick relief for unplanned gaps in sea billets. Under one scheme, termed 
sea-centric, 130% manning includes an extra 30% shore-based manning 
complement that rotates on and off the ship on a fixed schedule. Both these 
initiatives seem well-suited to supporting operational requirements while complying 
with the current downsizing in authorized manpower levels.    
The major features of the more sea-intensive force are that the Navy will have 
to get more sea duty out of senior E-6s and E-7s and find ways to quickly fill 
unplanned losses. This could be done by increasing existing incentive pays. 
Conversion to indefinite reenlistment would also complement these Navy initiatives 
by insuring that sailors with critical sea skills do not use the reenlistment contract 
and shore extension system to avoid sea duty.     
A. Assignments 
Deployment scheduling requires that officers and senior enlisted personnel 
are assigned to key department jobs.  To promote good teamwork, the same 
personnel should remain in these jobs for an entire sea tour.  For officers, this is 
usually not a problem because they are serving indefinite contracts.  However, under 
the current system a Chief Petty Officer’s reenlistment contract EAOS (End of Active 
Obligated Service) date may end before his sea tour.  Depending on his or her 
career choices at this decision point, the sailor may not complete the assigned duty.  
Under a system of indefinite reenlistment, this problem would be reduced; the 
acceptance of sea orders would commit a sailor to complete the tour.   
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B. Administrative Workload 
For grades E-6 and above, two or three reenlistments per sailor could be 
avoided under an indefinite reenlistment system.  There would be manpower 
savings in the inherent reduction in counseling, paperwork and perhaps SRB 
procedures. However, any administrative efficiency gained from indefinite 
reenlistment implementation might be offset by the additional time required for 
scheduling because a sailor’s EAOS date is uncertain.  The net result for manpower 
administration is unknown; it could be that the same number of personnel would be 
required, simply performing different functions.   
C. Sea Billet Manning 
The central focus of the enlisted detailing process is to fill required sea billets 
(measured by the sea billet manning percentage) on a consistent basis. This 
process involves working with a number of policies and incentives. Reenlistment 
contracts are but one such policy; assignment, location, platform type, length of tour, 
shore extension policies and variety of special pays (bonuses, sea pay and SDIP) 
must all be incorporated to achieve satisfactory results.  
It is beyond the scope of this study to include all of the relevant variables. 
However, we can measure several of the policies that influence sea billet manning in 
the E-7 to E-9 grades. The first, and probably most important, is the sea-shore 
rotation ratio assigned to a rating. The more time sailors are assigned to sea duty, 
the higher will be the manning percentage for that rating, all other factors held 
constant.  Promotion opportunity to petty officer and Chief Petty Officer is another 
influence.  In addition to the prestige and recognition that accompanies promotion, 
there is the very real monetary incentive.  For example, promotion to E-6 adds about 
$6000 to a sailor’s paycheck each year, plus an additional amount for housing 
allowances.  Therefore, faster promotion is a very big incentive for a sailor to remain 
in the Navy and go to sea, and we expect promotion opportunity to be positively 
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related to manning.  Bonuses and special pays have the same effect, but do not add 
to a sailor’s retirement income as does an increase in basic pay.     
To determine if there is a relationship between the important contributors to 
the sea billet manning percentage, a correlation was run using data from the Navy’s 
December 2007 Digital Dashboard and a CNA study of an earlier proposal for STEP 
(Sea Tour Extension Program).1 The variables included were SRB level (ZONE B, 
C), promotion opportunity to grades E-6 and E-7, and sea-shore rotation ratios by 
rating.  
The results show that while all of the variables have the expected positive 
signs, only sea-shore rotation and promotion opportunity to E-7 have relatively 
strong correlation coefficients  (>+.45) with sea billet manning percentages. A 
regression of these independent variables (sea-shore rotation and E-7 promotion 
opportunity) against the sea billet manning percentage yields the following estimated 
coefficients and statistical significance (t-statistics >1.2) as presented in Table 1. The 
regression has an R-squared value of .65 
Table 1:  Regression Results for Sea Billet Manning Ratio 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat 
Intercept 54.694 16.102 3.396 
Sea Shore  
Ratio 3.8970 3.234 1.204 
E7 Promotion 
Opportunity 0.2191 0.057 3.811 
 
These results suggest that if the Navy is to improve the manning of ships at 
sea (in the senior grades), leadership must consider increasing the opportunity to 
                                            
1 Golding, Heidi L.W. and Henry S. Griffis, Analysis of Proposed Sea Tour Extension Program, CAB 
98-129, Center for Naval Analysis, January, 1999. 
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promote to Chief Petty Officer as an important factor for sailors. A 5 percentage 
point increase in the opportunity of promotion to E-7 yields a 1.2 percentage point 
increase in the sea billet manning .  
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III. Costs 
If the introduction of indefinite reenlistment is met with negative reaction by 
the Chief Petty Officer force, it could negatively impact retention.  Such impacts 
would probably be felt in the years of service immediately following retirement 
eligibility—i.e., YOS 21 and 22.  In FY 2009, there will be about 8500 personnel in 
these year groups.  Assuming that their retention rates fall by 10 percentage points 
(from an average of 50% to 40%), then about 425 more chiefs would separate in that 
year.  
To offset (partially) this effect in ratings in which sea billet manning is less 
than 90%, incentive pays could be expanded.  For example, if all petty officers 
reaching 20 years of service were offered Special Duty Incentive Pay (SDIP), then 
sea billet manning should be no lower than at present.  Indeed, if SDIP has had the 
intended effects, then the manning rates might be higher.2  
At the current SDIP rates, in the current ratings, the estimated cost for 
FY2009 is shown in the following Table 2.   










E-7 $ 500 1193 6 $3.58
E-8 $ 750 313 6 $1.41
E-9 $ 750 81 6 $.36
Total  1587  $5.35
 
                                            
2 To date, there has not been a published analysis of the impact of SDIP. 
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If the introduction of indefinite reenlistment causes a 10 percentage point 
reduction in the reenlistment rates in years 21 and 22, then an additional 425 chiefs 
would need to be retained to offset this decline.  At an average of $562 per month 
(for 6 months), the additional incentive pay would add an additional $1.4 M to the FY 
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IV. Fairness and Equity 
Chief Petty Officers are a hard-working group; most have made sacrifices 
along the way to reach their status. Some are using the current reenlistment and 
shore extension polices to remain on active duty, but not serve time at sea.  To the 
extent that chiefs expect these policies to continue, an abrupt shift to a system of 
indefinite reenlistment could have a negative impact on retention.  Or put another 
way: once a Chief Petty Officer has reached retirement eligibility, he or she deserves 
the opportunity to bargain for the best assignment possible before being forced out 
of the Navy as a last resort.  
However, every Chief who remains on active duty without filling a critical sea 
billet (or agreeing to participate in an extra manning pool) reduces the promotion 
opportunity for junior members. This, in turn, reduces the retention and morale of 
some members—primarily in grade E-6—who might otherwise be highly motivated 
to seek promotion to Chief Petty Officer.   
The issue for the Navy is: “Do we really want to retain our senior enlisted 
sailors?”  Some shore duty is valuable, particularly in the training commands. But as 
the average life expectancy for Americans increases every year, a greater amount of 
money is required to pay for military retirees. Any reduction in the number of sailors 
who remain on active duty for 20 years, as well as a reduction in the number of 
years a sailor remains on active duty after 20 years, will yield long-run cost savings.  
If a senior sailor is required to accept a sea-going billet and is not allowed to remain 
in a shore billet, several things will occur.  First, there will be more senior leadership 
at sea, in billets which are frequently undermanned.  Second, the senior sailors will 
be unable to wait out their last few years on shore waiting for retirement.  This in 
itself could cause a reduction in those who remain on active duty until the 20-year 
mark and could also reduce the amount of time they remain on active duty after 20 
years.  Simply stated, if a sailor is forced to work hard up until the 20-year mark, only 
the best will stay for 20 years—thereby reducing retirement expenditures.   
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If a rating is not in short supply of sailors to fill sea billets, then conversion to a 
system of indefinite reenlistment would probably not cause any hardship.  Those 
sailors who rotate off of sea duty into a shore billet, and do not want to return to sea, 
could simply serve until they become retirement eligible.  The problem arises in 
ratings that are short of the senior grades in sea billets.   Determining an equitable 
transition plan, which meets the Navy’s needs and also member expectations, is 
addressed in the final chapter.     
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V. Recommendations of Naval Officers 
This chapter summarizes what active duty officers at the Naval Postgraduate 
School have to say on the subject of indefinite reenlistment.3 These observations are 
from a small, self-selected group, so the data cannot be considered scientific 
samples. Nevertheless, the opinions reflect both valuable personal experiences in a 
variety of communities, as well as a concern for the future path of the Navy. 
A majority of respondents felt that the Navy needs to eliminate the “dead 
weight” associated with the senior enlisted that choose non-technical jobs as their 
last tour before retirement. Some senior enlisted members need to be programmed 
into training billets before they retire. This will maximize the critical skills manpower 
prior to their retirement from the Navy. Manning ships and filling critical billets is 
often challenged when senior personnel turn down orders to sea because their 
contract is too short. Loopholes need to be closed to ensure that shore extensions 
are not an option when rotations to sea are executed. Critical leadership roles are 
often gapped due to senior enlisted personnel preparing to retire and extending their 
shore assignments.   
The Navy’s current policy requires enlisted sailors to sign a contract of 
reenlistment, typically for a period of 4 years.  For junior sailors (those under 10 
years of total service time), reenlistment is a valuable tool.  However, senior enlisted 
members do not seem to benefit from a contract enlistment.  Research has shown 
that the vast majority of senior sailors would remain in the Navy whether under 
contract or not. One officer stated that:   
quite often though, senior enlisted members become dead-weight, frequently 
referred to as “ROADS” or Retired On Active Duty Status.  It’s not uncommon 
to hear a senior sailor make a comment such as ‘I can do the last ten years 
standing on my head.’  Presumably, this is due to the fact that senior sailors 
                                            
3 Sixteen officers participated in a study of indefinite reenlistment as part of the course requirements 
for GB 4071, Economics and Cost-Benefit Analysis, Fall Quarter, 2008 (Enns, Fall 2008). 
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are often allowed to accept “easy” shore billets where they wait out their time 
to retirement.  Upon reaching 20 years, many sailors will remain on active 
duty if allowed to accept another shore rotation but immediately retire if forced 
to accept a sea-going billet.   
Another concern expressed by some officers was the impact of reenlistment 
contracts on promotion opportunity.  A switch to indefinite reenlistment would urge 
the non-promoting E-6 members to leave, thus opening up promotion opportunity 
ratings that have been full due to the stagnant top end of the force.  If leadership 
ensures there is opportunity at the top for junior sailors, the Navy could have fresh 
manpower  to tackle the future’s challenges. One officer quoted a flag officer as 
stating, “the generation gap between our senior enlisted and officers compared to 
the new graduates of boot camp and officer accession programs is too great.  There 
are new perspectives and fresh ideas arriving in our service that have not yet 
blended with the old.” 
One officer spoke of the “E-6 dilemma” and the impact of indefinite 
reenlistment:   
“The E-6 to E-7 barrier is probably the toughest challenge in any 
enlisted service member’s career.  Those who make Chief Petty Officer are 
almost without exception a highly motivated, professionally capable group of 
people.   Those who do not make it can still serve to retirement.  
Unfortunately, for numerous reasons, a lot of E-6’s never cross that barrier 
and will spend the majority of their career as a First Class Petty Officer.  A 
large percentage of those who fall into this category eventually (rightly or 
wrongly), accept that they will not make Chief.  The natural progression is for 
morale and motivation to decrease, which leads to a “doing the time to 
retirement” mentality.  The net result is the E-6 ranks being filled with 
unmotivated, substandard performers.  From personal observations, they 
make up approximately 10-15 percent of the Petty Officer First Class 
community.   
The dilemma pits overall proficiency of the Navy against taking care of a 
Sailor that usually has 15 years of service at that point.  This is basically a 
“lose-lose” situation because if the Sailor stays until retirement, the Navy as a 
whole suffers.  If the Sailor is discharged for non-grievous reasons (i.e., 
substandard performance) in favor of overall force proficiency, service 
members will come to see the Navy reneging on its promise to take care of its 
Sailors, which leads to lower morale and decreased proficiency.  The status 
quo is to live with the problem and put these service members in low-
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priority/visibility jobs (e.g., janitorial supervision).  Feasible solutions are 
difficult to come by.  Early retirements with less retirement pay and reserve 
force integration with retirement benefits at 65 have been discussed.  As a 
manager/leader, this has by far been my toughest challenge. 
However, this officer concluded that indefinite reenlistment would do little to 
solve this problem.   
A. Summary 
Almost all officers who responded felt that implementing an assignment-
based, indefinite reenlistment policy for Chief Petty Officers would benefit the Navy.  
The primary effect would be to give senior enlisted detailers more power to manage 
their particular rating communities.  The net result would be more sea duty billets 
filled.  The negotiation process for orders concerning duty location, platform type 
(e.g., Virginia Class Fast Attack Submarine, F/A-18C Hornet) and length of the tour 
would still take place.  However, oversight must be provided at the detailer level to 
ensure this increased power is not abused.  Also, because of the tight-knit nature of 
the Chief Petty Officer community, oversight is necessary to ensure service 
members up for sea duty are only being offered sea duty orders.  
For their part, the Chief Petty Officer community does a good job of 
maintaining job performance standards within their ranks. Under indefinite 
reenlistment, the combination of mandatory sea duty and severance packages 
would likely entice a small percentage of service members to separate or retire 
earlier than they would under the current system.  Because the military retirement 
plan is an “all or nothing” system, there is no incentive for senior enlisted personnel 
to separate prior to becoming retirement eligible.  Offering a severance pay package 
would entice a number of personnel to leave the Navy.  Most likely, those choosing 
to separate would not be the hard-charging, highly motivated sailors that make the 
Navy function.   
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VI. Conclusions and Recommendations 
This analysis has suggested that a conversion to indefinite reenlistment is in 
the best interests of the Navy.  Senior enlisted detailers would have more power to 
manage their rating communities. The net results would be a higher percentage of 
sea billets manned and better promotion opportunity for lower grades, as the senior 
grades would retain only those sailors willing to accept orders to sea.  
A. Costs 
Implementation of an indefinite reenlistment system would not dramatically 
save money due to the reduction in reenlistment actions in the senior grades. It 
could increase the costs of retaining sailors, since the numbers reenlisting in years 
21 and 22 could fall.  If reenlistment rates fall by 10%, then up to $1.4 M in SDIP 
could be required to maintain adequate sea manning in grades E-7 to E-9.  
B. Equity for Current Members 
To be fair to today’s Chief Petty Officers, the current fixed reenlistment 
system should be phased-out over a period of time.  However, the E-6 population 
should be converted immediately because the members of this group have invested 
in their community but have not yet reached retirement eligibility. Therefore, they can 
be relied upon to complete at least 20 years of service, regardless of whether or not 
they hold a reenlistment contract.  Some small percentage of this group may be 
discouraged by a switch to indefinite reenlistment and may not seek promotion to E-
7; however, the effects of this result should be minimal.  In addition, all new 
promotions to E-7, E-8 and E-9 should fall under the indefinite reenlistment system. 
To minimize the retention impacts among the pool of senior chiefs, the current 
crop of E-7 to E-9 sailors should be grandfathered—or given the option of switching 
to IR.  This may result in some “shirking”—i.e., remaining on active duty while using 
the fixed contract system to avoid sea duty.  However, the SDIP program is 
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designed to encourage sailors back to sea and should help overcome any 
deficiencies in sea manning.  The plan for implementation discussed below shows 
one way this transition could take place. 
C. Management Flexibility 
The Navy’s manpower goal is to provide the right numbers of sailors with the 
right skills to the fleet to meet deployment requirements.  The current fixed 
reenlistment contract system does not support this goal for all ratings because of 
conflicting polices and expectations of Chief Petty Officers concerning sea and shore 
duty.  A switch to indefinite reenlistment would better support the Navy’s goals for 
filling sea billets.  While indefinite reenlistment cannot accomplish this task alone, if 
initiated in conjunction with other compensation and assignment polices, the system 
could catalyze better sea manning and more productive sailors.  Those sailors 
(primarily in grade E-6) that desire to serve in shore billets at the end of their careers 
would then be encouraged to retire when eligible—i.e., as soon after 20 years of 
service as possible. In addition, increasing the promotion opportunity to Chief Petty 
Officer (E-7) in selected ratings would help fill billets at sea in those ratings plagued 
by shortages. 
D. A Plan to Implement IR 
Based on the preceding findings, a phase-in strategy for indefinite 
reenlistment seems appropriate.  All E-6s would convert to indefinite reenlistment at 
the start of FY 2009.  Since virtually all individuals in this grade (about 55,000 
personnel) are committed to a Navy career but are still ineligible for retirement 
benefits, there should be little impact on reenlistment rates up to 20 years of service.  
In addition, all new promotions to the Chief Petty Officer force would fall under IR.  
All current E-7s, E-8s and E-9s serving in ratings in which sea manning is below 
90% (estimated to be about 5,000 personnel) should be grandfathered under the 
fixed contract system (or given the choice to switch to IR).  Managing the conversion 
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by rating seems appropriate since several other programs use the same technique 
(i.e. selective reenlistment bonuses and SDIP).  
This plan is detailed by Grade and Fiscal Year in the following table. In Table 
3,  IR means indefinite reenlistment and Contract means fixed reenlistment contract: 
Table 3.  Plan for Conversion to Indefinite Reenlistment in FY 2009 
GRADE/ 
FISCAL YEAR     
 FY 2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 
E-9     
Critical skills* Contract Contract Contract IR 
Non-critical skills IR IR  IR IR 
E-8     
Critical skills* Contract Contract IR IR 
Non-critical skills IR IR IR IR 
E-7     
Critical skills* Contract IR IR IR 
Non-critical skills IR IR IR IR 
E-6 IR IR IR  IR 
Note: * Critical skills are defined by ratings in which sea billet manning has historically been less that 
90%.  Ratings currently eligible for Sea Duty Incentive Pay (SDIP) would be one way to identify these 
skills: AB, ABE, ABF, ABH AO, DC, EM, EN, ET, FC and MM (for selected grades and NECs).  
For these ratings, this phase-in approach would insure that no member of 
today’s Chief Petty Officer force would have his/her sea/shore options limited by the 
new reenlistment policy.  Some members of this group would most likely continue to 
turn down sea duty and remain in a shore billet until their EAOS was reached.  But 
this behavior would decrease over time as the force ages; indeed, by 2012 virtually 
all E-7 to E-9 personnel on fixed contracts would have separated or been promoted 
and would have been replaced by individuals on IR.  
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